









Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ongena, S., Popov, A., & Udell, G. F. (2011). Bank Risk-Taking Abroad: Does Home-Country Regulation and
Supervision Matter. (EBC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-007). European Banking Center.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. Jan. 2022
 
 
BANK RISK-TAKING ABROAD: DOES HOME-
































Does Home-Country Regulation and Supervision Matter?∗
Steven Ongena







This paper provides the first empirical evidence on how home-country regulation
and supervision affects bank risk-taking in host-country markets. We analyze lending
by 136 banks to 8,253 firms in 1,513 different localities across 13 countries. We find
strong evidence that laxer regulatory restrictions in the home country are associated
with higher loan rejection rates by banks in host-country markets, but that the resulting
loans are mostly to small, unaudited, nonexporting, and innovative firms. The results
are stronger when banks are less effi ciently supervised at home, and they are observed
independently from the effect that bank balance sheets have on lending. These findings
imply that loose home-country regulation and supervision are associated with important
negative externalities for the host-country in terms of more risk-taking by cross-border
banks.
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1 Introduction
Does the strictness of home-country bank regulation and supervision affect bank risk-taking abroad?
Although of crucial importance this question has never received an adequate treatment in the
empirical banking literature. A priori, the answer to this question is unclear as well. Stricter
home-country regulation may lead banks to act accordingly and conservatively abroad, for exam-
ple, through explicit home-country rules or by inducing them to act “as if they are at home.”This
appears in general to be consistent with the empirical literature that has found that foreign-owned
banks operating in emerging markets are more prudent than domestic banks (e.g., Crystal et al.,
2002). Alternatively, multinational banks may embark on a deliberate strategy of risk-taking abroad
to make up for the lack of risk-taking in their home-country market. For example, international
banks may have an incentive to relegate to their foreign subsidiaries (i.e., the bank’s “periphery”)
their riskier activities to which they limit their exposure (Powell and Majnoni, 2007). More gen-
erally, this could simply reflect a “search for yield”(Goldberg 2009). The goal of this paper is to
provide the first empirical test of these competing hypotheses.
We analyze bank risk-taking abroad and how it relates to the degree of home-country regula-
tion and supervision using an extensive firm-level dataset from emerging markets. We use data on
SME financial and non-financial charateristics to derive local measures of bank-lending behavior
and risk-taking. We ask two main questions regarding home-country "regulation" (i.e., the rules
that constrain bank condition, behavior, and activities) and home-country "supervision" (i.e., reg-
ulator monitoring of bank condition, behavior, and activities). First, we investigate whether loan
underwriting in local host-country markets is affected by how restrictive home-country regulation
and how effi cient home-country supervision is. We then study whether home-country regulation
and supervision exhibits a differential effect on loan-granting depending on the firm risk involved.
This combined strategy allows us to make inferences about the cross-border externalities associated
with domestic regulation and supervision, as well as about the type of firms that may benefit from
it.
Our key data come from the 2005 and 2008 waves of the World Bank-EBRD BEEPS survey of
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SMEs in emerging Europe. These data allow us to directly observe firms whose loan application
was turned down by a bank during the previous year. We combine these loan rejection rates with
data on the stringency and effi ciency of regulation and supervision in the home-country where the
parent bank is located. Although we do not have a direct match between firms and banks, we can
observe the precise locality in which each firm operates, as well as all banks that are present in this
locality. We can therefore match firms and banks through this geographic proximity. We focus on
host-country localities that are dominated by branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks. The final
sample consist of 8, 253 firms in 1, 513 localities served by a total of 136 banks.
We face two main challenges in our analysis. First, the banks’entry decisions are not made
randomly, i.e., banks tend to choose their foreign markets of operation; for example, South-Eastern
Europe has a large presence of Greek banks, while the Baltic countries are dominated by Scandina-
vian banks. A cross-country study of lending behavior would then suffer from a standard omitted
(macro) variables problem if banking markets only vary by (host) country. We circumvent this
problem by employing a within-country cross-locality analysis. Essentially, we are comparing two
localities within the same (host) country, one of which is served by international banks domiciled
in tightly regulated (home) countries, and the other by international banks domiciled in (home)
countries with lax regulation. This allows us to net out the effect of (host) country-level omitted
variables with (host) country fixed effects. Second, using loan rejection rates to define risk-taking
may be prone to a selection bias as applicant firms may be a systematically truncated sub-sample
of all firms. For example, some firms do not apply because they do not need credit, while others
do not apply because they are discouraged. If, for example, financially stronger firms account for
a larger share of all firms in local markets dominated by banks from tightly regulated markets, we
would overestimate the effect of home-country regulation on host-country risk-taking. By observing
data on non-applicant firms we are able to address this question in a standard two-step selection
framework (see Popov and Udell, 2010, and Ongena and Popov, 2011, for recent applications).
We provide the first empirical evidence that lax home-country regulation of cross-border banks is
associated with negative externalities in host-countries through bank risk-taking. By "risk-taking"
we mean lending to firms that are both more observably risky and/or more opaque (i.e., firms
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whose risk is not easily observable). Our key findings are threefold. First, banks are less likely
to grant loans in the host-country if home-country regulation is lax. Among the set of regulatory
practices, state ownership of banks and restrictions on entry in banking markets are the most
potent. Second, this lower likelihood of extending a loan is associated with the extension of loans
primarily to riskier corporate clients, such as small, informationally opaque, and innovative firms.
Third, host-country risk-taking is enhanced even further if home-country supervision is ineffi cient.
The results on the other hand imply that if home-country regulation is strict and home-country
supervision is effi cient, banks seek to lend more abroad but will "play it safe" by lending to less
risky and more transparent firms. This result could be viewed as clarifying findings in the literature
that foreign banks "cherry pick" the borrowers that they lend to in host countries (e.g., Berger et
al., 2001; Gormley, 2010; Mian, 2006; and Degryse et al., 2009, for a recent survey). Our findings
suggest that this phenomenon, however, may depend on the nature of home-country regulation.
In this respect, strict home-country regulation and effi cient supervision have a positive externality
on the availability of host-country credit. Our findings hold when conditioning on a large set of
observable firm-level characteristics, the effects are not subsumed in the degree of host-country
bank regulation and supervision, and they survive controlling for bank capital strength.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data. Section 3 describes the empirical
methodology and the identification strategy. Section 4 presents the initial results on the link
between home-country regulation and supervision and host-country lending. Section 5 assesses the
relation between home rules and foreign risk-taking. Section 6 discusses how our results relate to
the literature, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and summary statistics
2.1 Cross-border banks’branches in emerging Europe
We wish to determine how home-country regulation and supervision affects host-country loan pro-
vision and risk taking. To that end, we start by building a new database of the geographic presence
of large cross-border banks in local host-country markets. We choose a sample of 13 emerging
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European markets for which foreign bank presence is particularly relevant and for which we also
have firm level data. Next, we determine the set of banks operating in each host country that
together hold at least 85% of the banking sector assets in this country. We do so in order to make
the matching of banks and firms more manageable by excluding banks with insignificant national
presence. This gives us a total of 136 banks for a range of between 4 banks in Estonia and 9 banks
in Bulgaria. Out of those, 21 are domestic banks, and 115 are branches or subsidiaries of 23 foreign
banks from 12 different home countries. Next, we go through the web sites of all 136 banks in order
to determine in which locality each bank is present, and how many branches it has if present. We
compile this information for a total of 1,803 localities. This exercise allows us to determine not just
which bank is present in which local market, but also its market share at the unit of observation
of the locality (city). While we also collect data on domestic banks in the process, in the empirical
exercises we focus on those localities in which branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks account
for at least 50% of all banks present, or at least 50% of all bank branches. Depending on which of
the two criterion is used, we end up with a bank branching map of at least 1,513 localities.
Appendix 1 illustrates the degree of foreign bank penetration in each country in the sample.
Clearly, a group of 23 west European and U.S. banks controls the vast majority of assets in the
region. These are Erste Group, Hypo Group, Reiffeisen, and Volksbank (Austria), Dexia and KBC
(Belgium), Danske Bank (Denmark), Nordea Bank (Finland), Societe Generale (France), Bayerische
Landesbank and Commerzbank (Germany), Alpha Bank, EFG Eurobank, Emporiki Bank, National
Bank of Greece, and Piraeus Bank (Greece), AIB (Ireland), Intessa San Paolo and UniCredit
Group (Italy), ING Bank (Netherlands), Swedbank and Skandinaviska Enskilda Bank (Sweden),
and Citibank (U.S.). There is also substantial regional variation in the degree of penetration. For
example, the Greek banks operate mostly in south-eastern Europe, the Scandinavian banks in the
Baltic countries, and the Austrian banks in central Europe. In addition, there is one domestic
"global" bank, the Hungarian OTP, as well as cross-border penetration by, for example, Parex
Group - Latvia and Snoras Bank - Lithuania. Appendix 2 lists the coverage in terms of total
banking assets in each country. It ranges from 85% in Latvia to 98% in Albania.
Figure 1 presents a map of host countries (where the parent banks are domiciled) and of home-
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countries (where the local firms and the branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks operate). The
map illustrates our country selection strategy. In terms of host countries, the only markets in
emerging Europe that we have excluded are ones where foreign bank presence is limited (like
Belarus, Montenegro, or Moldova) or where there are too many banks to make the matching
exercise manageable (like Russia or Ukraine). In terms of home countries, some markets where
large cross-border banks are domiciled, like Spain, Switzerland, and the UK, are excluded because
the presence of banks such as Santander, UBS, and HSBC in the region is very limited. Finally,
only ING and Citigroup are present in the region through branches of the parent bank rather than
through subsidiaries.
2.2 Bank regulation and supervision
This paper evaluates theoretical predictions that key aspects of domestic bank regulation map into
loan provision and risk taking in foreign markets. In selecting from available databases, we use two
criteria. First, we analyze regulatory tools which have been highlighted by theory to affect bank
behavior. Second, we make sure that we focus on tools which vary suffi ciently across the home
countries in the sample. Thus, we examine the role of capital regulations, regulatory restrictions,
and bank supervision.
The two regulatory databases that we make use of are constructed by Barth et al. (2008) and
Abiad et al. (2008). From the former, we use indicators of capital regulation. Capital stringency is
an index of regulatory constraints on bank capital. This index is based on the following questions:
(1) Is the minimum capital asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with the Basel guidelines?
(2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? (3) Are unrealized values of loan
losses deducted from capital? (4) Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? (5) Are
unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted? (6) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as
part of capital? (7) Are the sources of funds classified as capital verified by the regulatory or
supervisory authorities? (8) Can the initial disbursement and subsequent injections of capital be
executed with assets other than cash or government securities? (9) Can initial disbursement of
capital be executed with borrowed funds? Thus, capital stringency does not measure statutory
5
capital requirements. Instead, it measures the regulatory approach to assessing and verifying the
degree of capital at risk in a bank.
We also use the indicator Restrictions on bank activities from Barth et al. (2008). This
index measures regulatory impediments to banks engaging in: (1) Securities market activities
(e.g.,underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry); (2) Insur-
ance activities (e.g., insurance underwriting and selling); (3) Real estate activities (e.g., real estate
investment, development, and management); and (4) the ownership of nonfinancial firms. Both
indices are also used in Laeven and Levine (2009).
From Abiad et al. (2008), we use two more indices. Regulatory stringency is a composite index
of regulatory restrictions which includes six separate categories. These categories are: (1) Credit
controls and ceilings; (2) Interest rate controls; (3) Entry barriers; (4) Privatization; (5) Restrictions
on international capital flows; and (6) Security markets regulation. In turn, the value for each sub-
index is determined in the following way. "Credit controls and ceilings" is based on the questions:
Are there minimum amounts of credit that must be channeled to certain sectors, or are there
ceilings on credit to other sectors? Are directed credits required to carry subsidized rates? Is there
a ceiling on the overall rate of expansion of credit? How high are reserve requirements? "Interest
rate controls" is based on whether deposit interest rates and lending interest rates are determined
at market rates, or whether they are set by the government or subject to ceiling/floor. "Entry
barriers" is based on the following questions: To what extent does the government allow foreign
banks to enter into a domestic market? Does the government allow the entry of new domestic
banks? Are there restrictions on branching? Does the government allow banks to engage in a wide
rage of activities? "Privatization" is based on the degree to which state-owned banks dominate the
domestic market. "Restrictions on international capital flows" is based on the following questions:
Is the exchange rate system unified? Does the country set restrictions on capital inflow? Does the
country set restrictions on capital outflow? "Security markets regulation" is based on the following
questions: Has the country taken measures to develop securities markets? Is the country’s equity
market open to foreign investors?
Finally, our index of Prudential supervision also comes from Abiad et al. (2008). It is based
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on the following questions: (1) Has a country adopted a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basle
standard? (2) Is the banking supervisory agency independent from executives’influence? (3) Does
the banking supervisory agency conduct supervision through on-site and off-site examinations? (4)
Does the country’s banking supervisory agency cover all financial institutions without exception?
This is the only index which captures the degree to which an active agency is involved in the
supervision of the banking sector and with the possible exception of the first questions is based on
more than the mere counting of existing mechanical regulatory rules.
All regulatory variables are scaled so that higher values indicate a more restrictive regulatory
environment. The supervision variable is scaled so that higher values indicate a greater degree of
government intervention.
2.3 Bank loan underwriting, bank risk taking, and firm-level characteristics
The data on bank loan underwriting, bank risk taking, and firm-level characteristics come from
the 2005 and the 2008 version of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS) on SMEs. We use two waves of the survey carried out in Spring 2005 and in Spring 2008
among 13, 409 firms from 27 countries in central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
The survey response rate was 36.9%. Surveyees who declined to participate or were unavailable for
interviews accounted for 38.3% of the original target group. Firms that were ineligible due to the
necessity to fulfill industry quotas and firm size quotas accounted for the remainder. We narrow
that initial sample down to the countries (as well as localities within these countries) which we
already determined to be suitable in terms of sizeable foreign bank penetration. The final sample
thus consists of 8, 253 firms, observed either in 2005 or in 2008, in 1,513 localities across 13 countries.
The main purpose of the survey is to obtain information from firms about their experience with
financial and legal constraints, as well as government corruption. In addition, however, BEEPS also
included questions about firm ownership structure, sector of operation, industry structure, export
activities, use of external auditing services, subsidies received from central and local governments,
etc. Respondent firms come from 6 different sectors: construction; manufacturing (11 sub-sectors);
transport; wholesale and retail; IT; and hotels and restaurants. The number of firms covered is
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roughly proportional to the number of firms in the country, ranging from 258 in Albania to 1, 430
in Poland. The survey tried to achieve representativeness in terms of the size of firms it surveyed:
between three quarters and nine tenths of the firms surveyed are "small" (less than 100 workers)
and only around 5% of the firms surveyed are "large" (more than 500 workers).1 The survey also
aimed to achieve representativeness in terms of private vs. public firms, firms with access to foreign
product markets, firms which receive government subsidies, etc. Table 1 provides the summary
statistics on the number of firms and their size, ownership, and other characteristics by country.
Appendix 1 explains the construction of all firm-level (as well as industry- and country-level)
variables in the data.
For the purpose of measuring bank loan underwriting, we use the information on the firm’s
most recent experience credit application. Question K16 asks: "Has the establishment applied for
any loans or lines of credit?"2 For firms that answered "No" to K16, Question K17 subsequently
asks: "What was the main reason the establishment has not applied for any line of credit or loan?".
For firms that answered "Yes" to K16, Question K18a subsequently asks: "Has this establishment
applied for any new loans or new credit lines that were rejected?". Firms that answered "No need
for a loan" to K17 were classified as firms that do not desire bank credit. Firms that answered
"Yes" to K18a or "Interest rates are not favorable", "Collateral requirements are too high", "Size
of loan and maturity are insuffi cient", or "Did not think it would be approved" to K17 were
classified as constrained. This strategy of grouping firms that were turned down and firms that
were discouraged from applying is standard in studies that rely on detailed questionnaires (see Cox
and Jappelli (1993)).3 Also, it is crucial given our empirical strategy to separate the firms that did
not apply for credit because they didn’t need it from those that did not apply because they were
discouraged. The literature has also suggested to group firms that were turned down and firms
that were discouraged from applying are observationally equivalent, and that discouragement is
1See http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm for further detailed reports on the represen-
tativeness of the survey.
2Fiscal year 2007 refers to the calender year 2007. However, for tax purposes, in the countries in the sample firms
can choose to extend it to March 31, 2008, which is precisely why the Survey was administered in March-April 2008.
Given that signs of a credit crunch started emerging right after August 9, 2007, the data gives us at least two and at
most three quarters of credit crunch effects potentially experienced by firms.
3Using data on central and east European firms, Brown et al. (2011) show that the share of firms discouraged
from applying is up to twice as large than the share of firms which applied and had their loan application rejected.
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frequently an actual rejection, following a conversation with the loan offi cer, which does not appear
in bank records (see Duca and Rosenthal (1993)). Table 2 presents a summary by country of the
shares of firms in need of bank loans and of constrained firms. As the data suggest, fewer firms
needed credit in fiscal year 2007 than in fiscal year 2004 (57% vs. 69%), and fewer of the firms that
actually applied were turned down (13% vs. 33%). However, this picture is slightly misleading as
the question in the 2008 survey asks about fiscal year 2007, while the question in the 2005 survey
asks about the firm’s experience with the latest loan.
3 Empirical methodology and identification
3.1 Main empirical model
Our goal is to evaluate how home-country regulation and supervision affects host-country loan
provision and risk taking. Given the data we have assembled, the immediate approach would be to
map regulation into loan rejection and the firm risk associated with granted loans. However, this
strategy would fail to account for the changing composition across business lenders of firms that
demand bank credit, or in other words, for the fact that the sample of firms that apply for credit
is not a random sample of the population of firms.
It is now customary to address this problem by incorporating information on non-applicant firms
in a standard 2-step Heckman procedure. The idea is that credit constraints are only observable
when a firm has a strictly positive demand for bank credit. Let the dummy variable Q equal 1 if
the firm desires positive bank credit and 0 otherwise. The value of Q is in turn determined by the
latent variable:
q = ζ · Zijkl + εijkl
where Zijkl contains firm and location variables that may effect the firm’s fixed costs and
convenience associated with using bank credit. The variable Q = 1 if q > 0 and Q = 0 otherwise.
The error εijkl is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2. The second stage regression
can now be updated by adding the term σ φ(q)Φ(q) to the RHS, where
φ(q)
Φ(q) is the inverse of Mills’ratio
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(Heckman, 1979). Identification rests on the exclusion restriction which requires that q has been
estimated on a set of variables that is larger by at least one variable than the set of variables in the
second stage.
Thus, in the second stage regression in which we determine the effect of domestic regulation
and supervision on loan granting in foreign markets, we thus estimate the following model:




where Yijklt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i in city j in country k in industry l in year t
is credit constrained; Xijklt is a matrix of firm characteristics; Re gjkt is a measure of home-country
bank regulation of the banks whose branches and subsidiaries are active in city j in country k; Dk is
a matrix of country dummies; Dl is a matrix of industry dummies; Dt is a matrix of year dummies;
and εijkl is an idiosyncratic error term. The firm-level co-variates control for observable firm-level
heterogeneity. The three sets of dummy variables control for any unobserved market, industry,
and business cycle variation. Essentially, they eliminate the contamination of the estimates by
time-invariant sectoral characteristics, like growth opportunities; by time-invariant macroeconomic
factors, like taxes or domestic regulation; and by global time-varying developments, like the credit
cycle.
In the second stage regression in which we determine the effect of domestic regulation and
supervision on risk-taking in foreign markets, we estimate the following model:




where Riskijklt is a measure of the ex-ante riskiness and opacity of firm i in city j in country k
in industry l in year t is. We define firms to be risky if they are, alternatively, small firms, firms
with unaudited financial statements, nonexporters, or innovative firms.4 The independent effect of
4Thus, our proxies for risk taking capture both opacity and risk. While being unaudited, for example, is specifically
an opacity measure, the other three measures are all proxies for both risk and opacity. We also focus on ex-ante
riskiness. An opaque firm, for example, is risky only ex-ante in the sense that its risk is unobserved, but ex-post it
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these variables is already subsumed in the matrix Xijklt.
The main parameter of interest in all three models is β2, which measures the effect of home-
country regulation and supervision on host-country lending. We construct the home-country bank
regulation index by aggregating data on home-country regulation and supervision after determining
which banks are present in each locality in each host country, as well as the parent bank of each
bank in each locality in each host country. The underlying assumption in the absence of a direct
match of each loan to the lending bank and of each rejection to the rejecting bank is that if firms
were granted/denied credit, then it was most likely the result of interaction with banks in the firms’
locality of incorporation. We use two different weighting criteria in constructing the index, namely,
giving equal weight to each bank in that particular locality, or weighting each bank’s home-country
regulation and supervision by the number of branches it has in the locality.
Here is an example to clarify the above procedure. There are 4 banks in Estonia that hold
close to 100% of the banking assets in the country: Swedbank, SEB, Sampo Pank, and Nordea.
They are subsidiaries of Swedbank - Sweden, SEB - Sweden, Danske Bank - Denmark, and Nordea
- Finland. In 2008, our index of prudential supervision from Abiad et al. (2008) takes on the value
of 2 in Sweden, 3 in Denmark, and 1 in Finland. Consider the city Lihula in which only Swedbank
has branches. We assign the prudential supervision index a value of 2 in Lihula, and then we
match this index of home-country bank supervision to all firms incorporated in that city. Consider
alternatively the city of Kuresaare, in which Swedbank, SEB, and Nordea are present. They have
2, 1, and 1 branches in that city, respectively. Consequently, in the main analysis, where we assign
equal probability of each firm in that city doing business with each bank present in that city, we
assign the prudential supervision index a value of 53 =
1
3 · 2 +
1
3 · 2 +
1
3 · 1, which is then matched
to all firms located in Kuresaare. And in the exercises where we weigh the probability of each firm
doing business with each bank present in Kuresaare by the number of that bank’s branches in that
locality, we assign the prudential supervision index a value of 74 =
1
2 · 2 +
1
4 · 2 +
1
4 · 1.
This procedure gives us considerable variation of our main financial variables of interest within
each country, due to the fact that not all banks present in a country are present in each city,
is not necessarily (or even on average) riskier than other firms whose risk is observable.
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and whenever they are, not to the same extent. For example, in the 2008 sample of firms, there
are 1, 102 localities in the 13 countries in the sample, characterized by 66 unique values of the
index of city-specific home-country regulation, when data on all banks in a locality are weighted
equally, and by 351 unique values of city-specific home-country regulation when data on all banks
is branch-weighted. Consequently, there is little reason to worry that the country fixed effects in
the regressions capture the same variation as locality-specific regulation and supervisory strength.
Importantly, identification is achieved not by comparing bank lending behavior and risk-taking
across countries, but across localities within countries, where the country effect is swept out by
country dummies.
Finally, we need to emphasize that throughout the paper, it is implicitly assumed that the
effect of bank financial distress is localized and realized predominately by firms headquartered in
the locality in which the bank has operations. All our empirical specifications presume that firms
borrow from banks located near their address of incorporation, which is identical to the approach
in, for example, Gormley (2010). In general this is expected to hold as banks tend to derive
market power ex ante from geographical proximity (e.g., Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Providing
support to that conjecture, empirical work regarding lending relationships in different countries
has demonstrated that the average distance between SMEs and banks is usually very small. For
example, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the median distance between a firm and its main
bank in the US over the 1973-1993 period was only four miles.
3.2 First stage regressions
Table 4 presents the results from the first stage probit regression of the Heckman correction pro-
cedure. The probability of positive demand for bank credit is generally lower for firms in localities
dominated by foreign banks from countries with stricter regulatory restrictions and more effi cient
bank supervision. In several cases, this effect is also statistically significant at the 10% level. For
example, in a locality with prudential supervision at the 75th percentile of effi ciency, the typical
firm exhibits, ceteris paribus, a 4.1% lower probability that it would have a positive demand for
bank credit than were it incorporated in a locality with prudential supervision at the 25th per-
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centile of effi ciency.5 This implies that along the regulatory and supervisory dimension, localities
may differ systematically in the type of firms that inhabit them. This could be because the in-
dustrial composition in localities dominated by banks domiciled in countries with more effi cient
supervision is skewed towards sectors that for technological reasons do not need much external fi-
nance. Alternatively, banks from countries with tighter regulation may have endogeneously chosen
to enter through branching networks that serve bank-dependent firms. Not accounting for such
selection mechanism would thus bias the estimates of the effect of regulation on loan provision and
risk-taking towards zero.
In terms of firm-level co-variates, the demand for bank credit increases in the size of the firm.
One potential explanation is that small firms face higher application costs (Brown et al., 2011).
Also, in a beginning-of-a-recession environment it might be that small firms are better equipped
to finance investment with cash flows than - potentially - more highly leveraged large firms. In
addition, some of the size effects may be picked by ownership and structural characteristics, as
sole proprietorships have a higher demand for loans. The probability of desiring credit is higher
for exporters potentially due to their faster expansion, and is lower for non-audited firms, which
might simply imply that firms choose to be audited (i.e., they are willing to pay for transparency)
when they plan to apply for bank credit.6 It may also be the case that audited firms have access to
financial statement lending which may be a cheaper lending technology (Berger and Udell, 2006).
Finally, innovative firms tend to have a lower demand for credit.
In terms of the exclusion restriction, the variables "Competition" and "Subsidized" are included
in this demand model, but excluded from the rest of the exercises. The rationale for using these
particular variables as instruments for demand is the following. Firms in more competitive envi-
ronments will likely have a higher demand for external credit due to lower profit margins, but it
is unlikely that credit decisions will be correlated with product market competition. Analogously,
having applied for state subsidies is likely a signal for external financial need. These considerations
make both variables good firm demand shifters. Both variables are very positively correlated with
5All percentage differences that are reported are calculated using the marginal effect at the sample mean.
6The results are broadly consistent with Ongena and Popov (2011) who apply a double selection technique to the
BEEPS 2005 sample.
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the demand for loans, and the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The F -statistics
from a first-stage regression of loan demand on the two variables (unreported) is 39.01 and 42.08,
for different weighting of home-country regulation and supervision, which satisfies the validity test.
Finally, due to information limitations in the data we only use 6,357 firms in these regression
rather than the 8,253 reported in Table 1. This is because in Table 4 and on, we focus on firms in
localities dominated by foreign banks. We thus lose information on 519 firms when we weigh the
regulatory and supervisory variables by banks present, and 887 firms when we weigh the regulatory
and supervisory variables by the number of branches of each bank present. The remaining part of
the reduction is accounted for by the firms which are incorporated in localities for which no data
on bank presence are available.
4 Home-country regulation and supervision and host-country lend-
ing
We start the main part of our empirical analysis with the estimation of Model (1) in which we study
how the stringency of home-country regulation and the effi ciency of home-country supervision
is mapped into host-country loan provision. The regressions presented in Table 5 suggest that
stricter home country regulation and less effi cient home-country supervision are associated with
lower rejection rates by cross-border banks in foreign markets.
In line with our identification strategy, we include country and time fixed effects in each of the
regressions, and in addition the standard errors are adjusted to control for clustering at the country
level. All six regressions control for a host of firm-level characteristics included in Table 4, with
the exception of "Competition" and "Subsidized" whose omission from the regressions is meant to
satisfy the exclusion restriction. The estimates of the regression coeffi cients on the non-excluded
firm-level variables imply that small firms, sole proprietorships, unaudited firms, non-innovative
firms, and non-exporting firms tend to be more constrained in credit markets. These results are
broadly in line with findings in the literature on SME lending that foreign banks cherry-pick (e.g.,
Berger et al., 2001; Mian, 2006; Gormley, 2010), as well as on the literature of how credit constraints
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vary with firm characteristics (e.g., Beck et al., 2005).
In Column (1), we use the composite index of regulatory stringency from Abiad et al. (2008).
This is an index comprised of purely mechanical rules, that is, it emphasizes the rule-book approach
to regulation and supervision rather than the enforcement approach. The negative sign of the
regression estimate implies that stricter home-country regulation is associated with lower host-
country rejection rates. In panel B where we construct the locality-wide index of regulation by
weighting by number of branches the information on home-country regulation for all banks present,
the coeffi cient is also statistically significant. Its magnitude implies that within the same country, a
typical firm operating in a locality dominated by banks with the regulatory stringency of the Italian
bank market has a 6.1% higher probability of having its loan application rejected than a typical
firm operating in a locality dominated by banks with the regulatory stringency of the Austrian
bank market. Recall that our identification strategy is based on a cross-locality within-country test
rather than a cross-country test, so we are not comparing rejection rates in country X, dominated by
Italian banks, and country Y, dominated by Austria banks. The 6.1% rejection rate differential is
rather calculated by comparing, within the same country, two cities served by banks from different
regulatory environments - for example, the Romanian town of Huedin (regulatory stringency value
of 0.5) and the Romanian town of Megdidia (regulatory stringency of 1.5).
In Column (2), we look at the effect on lending of the index of prudential supervision from
Abiad et al. (2008). We observe that higher government involvement in supervision has the
opposite effect to higher government involvement in regulation. Specifically, the positive sign of
the regression estimate implies that a more effi cient home-country supervision is associated with
higher rejection rates. In panel A where we construct the locality-wide index of regulation by
weighing equally the information on home-country regulation for all banks present, the coeffi cient
is also statistically significant at the 5%. To use the same example as before, the magnitude of the
coeffi cient implies that within the same country, a typical firm operating in a locality dominated by
banks with the effi ciency of the Italian bank supervisor has a 12.2% lower probability of having its
loan application rejected than a typical firm operating in a locality dominated by banks with the
effi ciency of the Austrian bank supervisor. The combined evidence implies that banks which are at
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home subject to higher regulatory stringency, but also to less effi cient supervision, tend to extend
more credit to an identical population of firms abroad. This evidence is fairly consistent with the
idea that strict regulation and ineffi cient supervision at home may incentivize cross-border banks
to search more actively for profit abroad.
In Columns (3) and (4), we check the effect of two other indices of regulation and supervision
on bank lending, the indices of restrictions on bank activities and of capital stringency from Barth
et al. (2008). These two turn out to have a statistically insignificant effect on bank lending, and
their sign switches across specifications depending on how we weigh the information on all banks
present in calculating the locality-specific indices on regulation and supervision.
In Column (5), we perform a horse race of all the regulatory and supervisory indices we have at
hand. This approach allows us to juxtapose rule-based regulation and activity-based supervision,
and study whether they have an independent effect on bank lending in foreign markets, or the
effect of one is subsumed in the effect of the other. We find that both matter simultaneously. The
positive effect of effi cient supervision on rejection rates, uncovered in Panel A, survives the inclusion
of indices for rule-based regulation, and the negative effect of stricter regulation on rejection rates
is undiminished by accounting for supervision.
Finally, in Column (6) we perform the same horse race, but we also include the inverse of
Mills’ratio estimated in the regressions reported in Table 4. The coeffi cient on the selection term
implies a negative correlation between unobservables in the equation for bank credit desirability
and those in the loan provision equation. This negative correlation implies that unobserved factors
that increase the demand for a bank loan tend to increase the probability of obtaining one. In
this specification, the effect of prudential supervision on the probability of loan rejection, albeit
still positive, is marginally insignificant. At the same time, the positive effect of home-country
regulation on host-country loan provision becomes significant regardless of how we construct the
locality-specific index of regulation. Therefore, the horse race coupled with accounting for selection
bias implies that stricter home-country regulatory stringency may to a larger degree incentivize
banks to look for profit abroad than less effi cient home-country supervision.
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5 Home-country regulation and supervision and host-country risk-
taking
5.1 Main result
In the previous section we established a link between the stringency of home-country regulation (and
to some extent the ineffi ciency of home-country supervision), on the one hand, and the granting
of loans in the host country, on the other hand. However, we do not know yet how these loans
are allocated, interms of risk and opacity, for example. It is possible that banks domiciled in more
tightly regulated markets extend more loans indiscriminately, or that they increase loan provision
predominantly to riskier firms, in search of the high-risk type of growth, or that they mostly lend
to the population of safe firms. Therefore, we cannot so far distinguish between theories about the
effect of domestic regulation and supervision on risk-taking in foreign markets. This question is
crucial in determining whether domestic regulation and supervision is associated with a positive or
with a negative externality in terms of risk-creation. The previous section suggests that such an
externality may exist.
We now proceed with the estimation of Model (2) in which we study how the stringency of
home-country regulation and the effi ciency of home-country supervision is mapped into risk-taking
by cross-border banks in host-country markets. The overarching message from the regressions
presented in Table 6 is that stricter home-country regulation and (to a lesser degree) less effi cient
home-country supervision is associated with higher rejection rates of small, opaque, and innovative
firms. The evidence thus implies that stricter regulatory rules and incentivize banks to expand
credit provision abroad in the search for profit, such banks mostly expand credit availability among
relatively safe corporate clients. Put alternatively, cross-border banks tend to engage in risk-taking
in foreign markets when they are less tightly regulated at home. Lax domestic bank regulation
(and to a lesser degree effi cient domestic bank supervision) seems to be associated with a negative
externality in terms of cross-border risk-creation.
Looking at the evidence itself, in Columns (1) and (5) we interact the index of regulatory
stringency from Abiad et al. (2008) with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the applicant firm is
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small (fewer than 100 employees). The estimate of the direct effect of regulation on loan provision
continues to imply that stricter regulation results in higher loan availability. The results, however,
also indicate that the impact of regulatory stringency on the probability of accepting a loan appli-
cation depends on the size of the corporate client applying for a bank loan. The interaction term
enters positively and statistically significantly the regression. Consistent with standard approaches
to bank regulation, the sign of the effect implies that higher regulatory stringency domestically re-
duces risk-taking in foreign markets. A small firm has a between 5.6% and a 6% higher probability
of having its loan application rejected if it is dealing with banks at the 75th percentile of the sample
domestic regulatory stringency relative to an identical firm in the same country dealing with banks
at the 25th percentile of the sample domestic regulatory stringency.
In Columns (2) and (6) we perform the same exercise, where firm-level opacity is proxied by
whether the firm is audited or not. We find the exact same result: While the estimate of the direct
effect of regulation on lending implies that stricter regulation results in higher loan availability, the
interaction term between bank regulation and firm opaqueness enters positively and statistically
significantly in the regression. To the extent that informationally opaque firms are ex-ante riskier,
the sign of the effect implies that higher regulatory stringency domestically reduces the incentives
of banks to extend loans to such firms in foreign markets. An opaque firm has a between 5.3%
and a 5.6% higher probability of having its loan application rejected if it is dealing with banks
at the 75th percentile of the sample domestic regulatory stringency relative to an identical firm
in the same country dealing with banks at the 25th percentile of the sample domestic regulatory
stringency.
In Columns (3) and (7), firm-level risk is proxied by whether the firm has access to foreign
markets or not. To begin with, it is unclear whether in this case higher risk is implied by a
value of 0 or by a value of 1. Exporting firms may be riskier if their profit stream is sensitive
to shocks to foreign demand. Alternatively, foreign demand may be more stable than domestic
demand, or differently put, such firms may experience higher growth for the same level of demand
volatility. The independent effect of being an exporter on loan rejection rates is negative, implying
that banks in general prefer to extend credit to firms which, ceteris paribus, sell their products
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in foreign markets. The interaction with bank regulation, but also with bank supervision, enters
negatively in the regressions, as well as significantly in at least one case. Given that in most of our
exercises tight domestic regulation seems to be the mirror image of light domestic supervision, the
evidence on their impact on risk-taking in foreign markets is inconclusive. If we choose to focus on
the effect of regulation, in order to build upon the results from the previous exercises, we can report
that stricter domestic regulation tends to make banks more willing to lend to exporting firms in
foreign markets. To the extent that exporting tends to be associated with "good" rather than with
"risky" growth prospects as only the most productive firms engage in foreign activities (Helpman
et al., 2004), the evidence continues to imply that stricter domestic regulation reduces risk-taking
abroad.
Finally, in Columns (4) and (8) we proxy firm risk with whether the firm is an innovative
one (i.e., whether it has introduced a new product in the past 3 years). Innovative firms can be
viewed as risky, especially if they operate in industries where innovation is R&D- and intangibles-
intensive and thus there are few collateralizeable assets to be pledged against a bank loan. Thus
our innovation variable likely mirrors R&D which has been frequently used to proxy for risk and
informational opacity (e.g., Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Coles et al., 2006; Ashcraft and Santos, 2007).
In this exercise, we again confirm that tight regulatory rules affect banks’incentives in the same way
ineffi cient supervision does. In particular, the two variables that enter the regressions significantly,
are the composite index of regulatory stringency from Abiad et al. (2008) and the index of capital
stringency from Barth et al. (2008). The latter index is more supervision-like in that it measures
the regulatory approach to assessing and verifying the degree of capital at risk in a bank rather
than a set of rules. Higher values of the regulatory stringency index and lower values of the capital
stringency index are associated with lower loan rejection rates. The interaction terms with the
index of whether the firm is innovative enter with the opposite sign. This once again implies that
the over-and-above increase in loan provision induced by stricter domestic regulation and ineffi cient
domestic supervision has mostly affected firms with more conservative product lines. Therefore, the
increase in lending in foreign markets induced by these types of domestic regulation and supervision
seems to have been characterized by a flight away from risk.
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5.2 Interaction between supervision and regulation
Some authors have argued that the effect of strict regulation may vary with the strength of the
bank supervisor. For example, restrictions on bank activities may be relatively more desirable
in environments where the public sector lacks the ability to monitor banks because of ineffi cient
offi cial supervision. Similarly, capital regulations may be especially important in countries with a
regulatory environment that does not spur private monitoring (see Barth et al., 2004, for an expo-
sition of these arguments). Alternatively, powerful supervisors may have an incentive to undertake
socially sub-optimal actions. This situation may arise if there are agency problems between taxpay-
ers and bank supervisors, for example when supervisors are self-interested and there is uncertainty
about their ability to monitor banks, as in Boot and Thakor (1993). If this is the case, then strict
regulation will limit the instability consequences of powerful and effi cient supervision.
To test these hypotheses, we examine whether the effect on bank host-country risk-taking of
regulating banks more strictly in home markets depends on the degree of home-country supervision.
In particular, we have now added to our Model 2 three triple interaction terms: Regulatory strin-
gency × Prudential supervision × Risk, Restrictions on bank activities × Prudential supervision
× Risk, and Capital stringency × Prudential supervision × Risk, where as before, risk/opacity is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is small, unaudited, non-exporting, or innovative.7 A neg-
ative coeffi cient would imply that various types of home-country regulatory restrictions are more
effective in restricting host-country risk-taking (in the sense of extending loans to ex-ante risky
and/or opaque corporate clients) when home-country supervision is less effi cient. Conversely, a
positive coeffi cient would imply that strict regulation and effi cient supervision are complements in
enhancing bank stability.
The estimates of this expanded model are reported in Table 7. The evidence points to com-
plementarities between regulation and supervision, in that the estimates of the coeffi ceints on the
interaction effects are generally positive and in several cases significant. For example, general reg-
ulatory stringency reduces host-country risk-taking relatively more if banks are more effi ciently
7The regression also includes all possible double interaction terms between each of the three regulatory variables,
prudential supervision, and each proxy for risk.
20
supervised in home markets when risk-taking is proxied by extending loans to small firms (Column
(1)) and to non-exporting firms (Column (3)). Similarly, restricting bank activities reduces host-
country risk-taking relatively more if coupled with more effi cient home-country supervision when
risk-taking is proxied by lending to unaudited firms (Column (2)) and to non-exporting firms (Col-
umn (3)). Finally, higher home-country capital stringency is relatively more effi cient in reducing
host-country risk-taking if banks are more effi ciently supervisied in home markets when risk-taking
is proxied by extending loans to unaudited firms (Columns (2) and (6)).
5.3 Accounting for the effect of bank balance sheets
Variation in home-country regulation is by far not the only possible explanation for the variation in
host-country risk-taking. The strength of the banks’balance sheet can obviously affect bank lending
behavior independently of regulatory rules and supervisory effi ciency.8 The bank lending channel
has been studied extensively (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000), and banks have been found to rely
heavily on the use of internal capital markets in order to dampen domestic liquidity shocks (e.g.,
Stein, 1997; Houston et al., 1997). The U.S. credit crunch in 1990-92 and banking crises around
the world have spawned a large literature on the real effects of bank internal capital markets.9
More importantly for our study, the cross-border dimension of the bank balance sheet channel
has also been investigated. For example, Peek and Rosengren (1997) show that the decline in
Japanese parents’ risk-based capital ratio translated into a significant decline in total loans by
the U.S. subsidiaries in the 1990s. Chava and Purnanandam (2009) and Schnabl (2011) use the
exogenous shock provided by the Russian crisis of 1998 to study the effect on lending to U.S. and
Peruvian borrowers, respectively. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) and De Haas and van Lelyveld
(2010) show that the existence of internal capital markets with foreign bank affi liates contributes
to an international propagation of domestic liquidity shocks to lending by affi liated banks abroad.
In the context of the 2007-08 crisis, Puri et al. (2010) test the effect of deteriorating balance sheets
8While regulation and supervision affect bank fragility directly (through, for example, minimum capital require-
ments), two banks which conform to the same capital standards may behave differently if their balance sheets are of
different strength.
9For some empirical investigations of the bank balance sheet channel, see Bernanke and Lown (1991), Berger and
Udell (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1995), Woo (1999), Kang and Stulz (2000), Khwaja and Mian (2008), and Jimenez
et al. (2011).
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of German banks exposed to US asset shocks on lending to domestic retail customers, and Popov
and Udell (2010) present evidence that the capital crunch in large European banks begot a credit
crunch by their subsidiaries in emerging Europe in the early stages of the crisis.
Therefore, it is important to account explicitly for the independent effect of bank balance
sheet strength. We do so in Table 8 where we include interaction of parent bank capitalization
(essentially, the Tier 1 capital ratio for parent banks, weighted equally or by number of branches
for all subsidiaries present in a particular locality) with firm risk/opacity. We confirm that balance
sheet strength has an independent effect on risk-taking: Banks with lower Tier 1 capital ratios
extended more loans to unaudited (Columns (2) and (6)) and non-exporting (Columns (3) and
(7)) firms. Importantly, our main results on the reduction in host-country risk-taking resulting
from stricter home-country regulation survives when risk-taking is proxied by lending to small,
unaudited, and innovative firms.
6 Discussion of results
There is a large literature on the role of government in regulating economic activity (Pigou, 1938;
Stigler, 1971). One of the prime targets of such regulation are commercial banks because their
risk-taking behavior has important implications for financial and economic fragility (Bernanke,
1983; Calomiris and Mason, 1997, 2003a,b). To that end, various domestic regulatory and supervi-
sory agencies have been charged with the task to monitor and assess bank risk. The construction
of databases containing indices of regulatory stringency and supervisory structure has enabled re-
searchers to look into how the actions of these agencies have affected various banking developments.
For example, Barth et al. (2004) show that restrictions on bank activities affect negatively bank
development, while capital regulations enhance bank stability. Laeven and Levine (2009) show that
capital requirements and capital stringency reduce risk-taking by banks, and also that this effect
depends crucially on the bank’s ownership structure.
Our evidence suggests that to different degrees, these results extend across borders. For example,
we find that higher restrictions on bank activities in home countries lead cross-border banks to
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extend more loans to opaque corporate clients in host-country markets (Table 6, Column (6)). To
the extent that informational opacity is associated with higher ex-ante risk, this result suggests
an increase in risk-taking abroad following higher restrictions on bank activities at home. This is
consistent with theories implying that fewer regulatory restrictions increase the franchise value of
banks and therefore augment incentives for more prudent behavior (see Barth et al., 2004). This
result is also consistent with prior empirical evidence indicating that restricting bank activities has
negative repercussions. For example, Barth et al. (2001) find that such restrictions are associated
with a higher probability of a major banking crisis and lower banking-sector effi ciency. However,
prior evidence has only documented the domestic dimension of this effect. Our results suggest
that restrictions on bank activities domestically may lead to risk-taking abroad - potentially to
compensate for the inability to perfectly diversify in home markets.
Our results also suggest that higher capital stringency in home countries leads cross-border
banks to extend more loans to innovative firms (firms that introduce at least one new product line
every three years) in foreign markets (Table 6, columns 4 and 8). It is theoretically ambiguous if
innovative firms are more or less risky customers. However, Table 5 suggests that, ceteris paribus,
innovative firms face statistically higher rejection rates. Therefore, it seems that the banks in our
sample tend to treat innovative firms as riskier. In that sense, the lower rejection rates of innovative
firms by banks domiciled in markets with more stringent capital requirements implies that these
banks may be making up abroad for the inability to engage in high risk-high return lending at
home. Barth et al. (2004) and Laeven and Levine (2009) both show that capital requirements
decrease bank riskiness and the share of non-performing loans. Our results imply that lending in
foreign markets is a mirror image of domestic behavior. However, in both the case of restrictions
on bank activities and in the case of capital requirements, the evidence is not consistent across the
range of proxies for risk-taking, and so it is suggestive rather than conclusive.
Our most consistent result is that higher regulatory restrictions result in more loans being
extended to predominantly safe corporate clients in foreign markets. This implies that tighter
regulation at home induces cross-border banks to act conservatively in foreign markets. To the
extent that most of the cross-country variation in this index comes from the degree of involvement
23
of state-owned banks and from barriers to entry, this evidence is consistent with theories of the
beneficial effect of competition in enhancing prudent risk-taking behavior, as well as theories arguing
that governments do not have suffi cient incentives to ensure socially desirable outcomes (see Shleifer
and Vishny, 1998, for an extensive treatment of both arguments). Our evidence seems to go against
the argument in Gerschenkron (1962) that governments have adequate information and incentives
to invest in strategically important projects, as well as against the argument in Keeley (1990) that
banks with monopolistic power possess greater franchise value, inducing them to behave prudently.
Finally, we also find that more effi cient domestic supervision is associated with lower lending
propensity in foreign markets (Table 5, Panel A, Columns (2) and (5)), but that most of the
loans approved are allocated to exporter firms (Table 6, Column (7)). To the degree that, all
else equal, exporter firms are less constrained (therefore, less risky) in the sample (Table 5), this
evidence suggests that banks which are more effi ciently supervised at home engage in a safer lending
strategy in foreign markets. This confirms previous arguments that effi cient offi cial supervision
prevents banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking behavior, thus improving their performance
and stability. However, the evidence is observed only for one proxy for risky lending, and therefore,
consistent with Barth et al. (2004), we can conclude that the features that constitute offi cial "core"
domestic supervision are not strongly associated with bank risk-taking in foreign markets.
In general, our results also offer insights into the role of foreign banks in emerging markets.
Overall, the effect of foreign banks on business lending in the literature is ambiguous. A large
literature has found that foreign bank presence is associated with higher access to loans (Clarke et
al., 2006), higher firm-level sales (Giannetti and Ongena, 2009), and lower loan rates and higher
firm leverage (Ongena and Popov, 2011). On the other hand, Berger et al. (2001), Mian (2006), and
Gormley (2010) show that foreign banks tend to finance only larger, established, and more profitable
firms. Our paper adds to this line of research by providing evidence that foreign banks tend to
modify their loan portfolio in response to shocks to bank regulation in home-country markets.
Managerial issues might also be important here given the challenges associated with cross border
banking (e.g., Berger et al., 2000). Managerial focus on solving problems at the headquarters level
in the home country could reduce the ability of the parent bank to monitor lending activities in its
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foreign facilities. Given the organizational frictions associated with lending a la Stein (2002), this
reduced monitoring ability could have a disproportional effect on credit availability. Our finding
that riskier borrowers are more affected might even suggest a link to the institutional memory
explanations of pro-cyclical lending behavior (e.g., Berger and Udell, 2004) where eroded lending
expertise is more problematic at foreign banks.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical assessment of theories that relate lending and risk-
taking by cross-border banks in foreign markets to domestic bank regulation and supervision.
Theory yields inconclusive predictions: strict domestic regulation may incentivize banks to engage
in less (act "as if at home") or in more (make up for the lack of risk-taking domestically) risk-taking
abroad. We assess these questions by first mapping the scope of the operations of large cross-border
banks in 1,513 localities in 13 countries in emerging Europe, and then study how the loan granting
process involving corporate clients with various risk profiles relates to the degree of regulation and
supervision in the banks’home countries. By employing a cross-locality within-country empirical
strategy, we partially address the problem with the endogeneity of foreign bank entry. By using
data on local corporate clients to define risk-taking we address the problem that standard measures
of bank riskiness, like the Z-score (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009), poorly capture the foreign
component of the risk-taking behavior of large multinational banks.
We find that loan incidence is lower in localities dominated by foreign branches and subsidiaries
of banks domiciled in countries with lower regulatory stringency. Second, this lower lending propen-
sity is associated with the granting of loans primarily to riskier corporate clients, such as small,
informationally opaque, and innovative firms. This effect is stronger when home-country super-
vision is ineffi cient. Taken together, our findings imply that banks tend to look for safer growth
abroad if they are restricted from risk taking in domestic markets. Our findings hold when condi-
tioning on a large set of observable firm-level characteristics, the effects are not subsumed in the
degree of host-country bank regulation and supervision, and they hold independently of the effect
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of bank balance sheet strength on lending. This evidence is moderately supportive of theories which
argue that strict regulation in the home country induces cross-border banks to act accordingly and
conservatively abroad. Our results thus seems to suggest that lax domestic bank regulation has
important negative externalities through the channel of risk-taking abroad by cross-border banks.
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Figure 1. Origin and target countries in the data 
 
 
The map shows the cross-border dimension of the underlying data. Countries in dark color (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, and 
Sweden) are the home countries in which the parent banks in the dataset are incorporated. Countries in light color (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are the host countries where the firms in the dataset are incorporated.  
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Table 1. 
Summary statistics: Firm characteristics 
             




prietorship Privatized Non-exporter Opaque Firm age Innovative Subsidized Competition 
Albania 258 0.90 0.03 0.01 0.74 0.06 0.69 0.26 10.43 1.62 0.04 0.74 
Bulgaria 581 0.84 0.03 0.05 0.51 0.12 0.76 0.58 15.89 1.62 0.06 0.62 
Croatia 340 0.79 0.05 0.06 0.44 0.23 0.64 0.53 23.06 1.51 0.18 0.79 
Czech Republic 593 0.79 0.04 0.04 0.41 0.08 0.65 0.57 13.10 1.63 0.16 0.82 
Estonia 492 0.79 0.03 0.13 0.27 0.11 0.66 0.20 14.79 1.52 0.14 0.77 
Hungary 901 0.80 0.04 0.01 0.63 0.12 0.64 0.26 14.84 1.67 0.22 0.88 
Latvia 476 0.72 0.04 0.01 0.36 0.12 0.69 0.31 14.47 1.49 0.11 0.78 
Lithuania 481 0.77 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.16 0.63 0.60 14.29 1.40 0.15 0.78 
Macedonia 566 0.81 0.03 0.05 0.32 0.16 0.61 0.46 17.41 1.48 0.04 0.84 
Poland 1,430 0.83 0.02 0.05 0.78 0.09 0.74 0.63 17.96 1.58 0.13 0.84 
Romania 1,141 0.73 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.13 0.80 0.63 14.43 1.61 0.09 0.71 
Slovakia 495 0.74 0.05 0.06 0.54 0.11 0.66 0.45 14.54 1.56 0.13 0.79 
Slovenia 499 0.74 0.05 0.08 0.29 0.21 0.44 0.57 23.02 1.52 0.22 0.79 
Total 8,253 0.79 0.04 0.05 0.46 0.12 0.68 0.49 16.08 1.57 0.13 0.79 
Note: The table presents statistics on the number of firms and the share of firms by size, ownership, privatization history, access to foreign product markets, access to 
international auditing, subsidies from central and local governments, and degree of competition, by country. ‘Small firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 
employees. ‘Big firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has more than 250 employees. ‘Public company’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a shareholder company, or its 
shares traded in the stock market. ‘Sole proprietorship’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firms is a sole proprietorship. ‘Privatized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former 
state-owned company. ‘Non-exporter’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the does not have access to foreign markets. ‘Opaque’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm does not employ 
external auditing services. ‘Firm age’ is the firm’s age in years. ‘Innovative’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has introduced a new product line in the past 3 years. 
‘Subsidized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received subsidies during the last 3 years from central or local government. ‘Competition’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
firm faces fairly, very, or extremely strong competition. Omitted category in firm size is ‘Medium firm’. Omitted category in firm ownership is ‘Private company’. See 
Appendix 1 for exact definitions and data sources.  
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Table 2.  
Summary statistics: Credit demand and access 
   
 2005 2008 
Country Need loan Constrained Need loan Constrained 
Albania 0.68 0.30 0.29 0.47 
Bulgaria 0.65 0.36 0.58 0.52 
Croatia 0.78 0.14 0.59 0.42 
Czech Republic 0.56 0.41 0.53 0.32 
Estonia 0.60 0.23 0.54 0.27 
Hungary 0.78 0.28 0.41 0.31 
Latvia 0.70 0.29 0.59 0.47 
Lithuania 0.71 0.30 0.60 0.23 
Macedonia 0.68 0.56 0.59 0.50 
Poland 0.68 0.45 0.53 0.41 
Romania 0.72 0.32 0.61 0.33 
Slovakia 0.62 0.21 0.53 0.40 
Slovenia 0.72 0.11 0.64 0.15 
Total 0.69 0.33 0.56 0.37 
Note: The table presents statistics on the share of firms who declare bank loans desirable, and the share 
of firms out of those that need a loan that have been formally rejected or did not apply because they 
found access to finance too difficult, by country. The data are for the fiscal year 2007 (until March 31, 


































Bank regulation and supervision 
     
Panel A. Home countries 










Austria  1.5 2.5 5 5 
Belgium  0 2.5 9 4 
Denmark  0 3 8 2 
Finland  2 1 7 4 
France  0 3 6 2 
Germany  2 3 5 1 
Greece  2.5 2 9 3 
Ireland  0 3 8 1 
Italy  0.5 2 10 4 
Netherlands  0 2.75 6 3 
Sweden  0 2 9 3 
United States  0  3 12 4 
Total 0.7 2.4 7.8 3 
     
Panel B. Host countries 










Albania  1.910 2.117 7.474 3.977 
Bulgaria  1.784 2.171 8.350 3.328 
Croatia  0.856 2.187 8.171 4.124 
Czech Republic  0.610 2.623 6.781 3.804 
Estonia  0.332 2.016 8.486 2.984 
Hungary  1.033 2.288 7.345 4.062 
Latvia  0.478 2.000 4.535 1.512 
Lithuania  0.156 2.159 7.390 2.536 
Macedonia  1.625 2.368 7.825 2.561 
Poland  0.349 2.464 8.753 2.848 
Romania  1.210 2.483 6.668 3.693 
Slovakia  0.920 2.418 7.141 4.534 
Slovenia  0.198 2.621 8.190 3.649 
Total 0.851 2.340 7.541 3.324 
Note: The table reports summary statistics on average strength of over 2002-2005 of bank supervision and 
regulation, by home (Panel A) and host (Panel B) country. ‘Regulatory stringency’ is an index of the 
strength of regulatory restrictions over 2002-2005, taken from Abiad et al. (2008). ‘Prudential supervision’ 
is an index of the scope and efficiency of home-country supervision over 2002-2005, taken from Abiad et 
al. (2008). ‘Restrictions on bank activities’ is an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks 
over 2002-2005, taken from Barth et al. (2008). ‘Capital stringency’ is an index of regulatory oversight of 
bank capital over 2002-2005, taken from Barth et al. (2008). In Panel B, the three variables are locality-
specific and are constructed by weighting by number of branches the respective home-country variable for 
each parent bank which has at least one branch or subsidiary in that locality. See Appendix 1 for exact 
definitions and data sources.  
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Table 4. 
Probability of positive demand for credit 
  
 Equally-weighted Branch-weighted 
Regulatory stringency -0.153 -0.122 
 (0.087)* (0.086) 
Prudential supervision -0.191 -0.214 
 (0.114)* (0.115)* 
Restrictions on bank activities 0.013 -0.016 
 (0.040) (0.034) 
Capital stringency -0.037 -0.022 
 (0.082) (0.067) 
Small firm -0.133 -0.152 
 (0.050)*** (0.051)*** 
Big firm 0.055 0.048 
 (0.101) (0.101) 
Public company -0.014 -0.086 
 (0.084) (0.087) 
Sole proprietorship 0.191 0.207 
 (0.041)*** (0.042)*** 
Privatized 0.206 0.152 
 (0.057)*** (0.058)*** 
Non-exporter -0.154 -0.193 
 (0.038)*** (0.039)*** 
Opaque -0.124 -0.127 
 (0.037)*** (0.038)*** 
Firm age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Innovative -0.185 -0.185 
 (0.035)*** (0.036)*** 
Competition 0.131 0.127 
 (0.041)*** (0.042)*** 
Subsidized 0.312 0.303 
 (0.053)*** (0.055)*** 
Number of observations 6,357 6,020 
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.05 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm desires bank credit. ‘Regulatory 
stringency’ is an index of regulatory restrictions. ‘Prudential supervision’ is an index of the scope and 
efficiency of home-country supervision. ‘Restrictions on bank activities’ is an index of regulatory 
restrictions on the activities of banks. ‘Capital stringency’ is an index of regulatory oversight of bank 
capital. The three variables are locality-specific and are constructed by weighting equally (Columns 
labelled “Equally-weighted”) or by the number of branches (Columns labelled “Branch-weighted”) the 
respective variable for each parent bank which has at least one branch or subsidiary in that locality. ‘Small 
firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 employees. ‘Big firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
firm has more than 250 employees. ‘Public company’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a shareholder 
company, or its shares traded in the stock market. ‘Sole proprietorship’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firms is 
a sole proprietorship. ‘Privatized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. 
‘Non-Exporter’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm does not export to foreign markets. ‘Opaque’ is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm does not employ external auditing services. ‘Firm age’ is the firm’s age in years. 
‘Innovative’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has introduced a new product line in the past 3 years. 
‘Competition’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm faces fairly, very, or extremely strong competition. 
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‘Subsidized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has received in the last 3 years subsidies from central or 
local government. Omitted category in firm size is ‘Medium firm’. Omitted category in firm ownership is 
‘Private company’. Only localities where branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks account for more than 
50% of the local market are included. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. White (1980) 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 




Home country bank regulation and supervision, and host-country loan rejection rates 
  
Panel A. Equally-weighted regulation and supervision data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulatory stringency -0.079    -0.133 -0.240 
 (0.121)    (0.131) (0.133)* 
Prudential supervision  0.344   0.276 0.198 
  (0.152)**   (0.165)* (0.175) 
Restrictions on bank    -0.074  -0.066 -0.080 
activities   (0.047)  (0.056) (0.057) 
Capital stringency    -0.106 0.023 0.037 
    (0.099) (0.116) (0.118) 
Small firm 0.454 0.460 0.458 0.455 0.460 0.356 
 (0.069)*** (0.069)*** (0.069)*** (0.069)*** (0.069)*** (0.073)*** 
Big firm -0.110 -0.121 -0.114 -0.112 -0.117 -0.045 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.153) 
Public company 0.233 0.233 0.227 0.229 0.238 0.219 
 (0.119)* (0.120)* (0.119)* (0.120)* (0.120)** (0.120)* 
Sole proprietorship 0.120 0.098 0.115 0.118 0.104 0.207 
 (0.053)** (0.054)* (0.053)** (0.053)** (0.054)* (0.061)*** 
Privatized -0.175 -0.181 -0.173 -0.173 -0.181 -0.037 
 (0.077)** (0.077)** (0.077)** (0.077)** (0.077)** (0.082) 
Non-exporter 0.234 0.234 0.233 0.234 0.234 0.127 
 (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.056)** 
Opaque 0.370 0.369 0.369 0.368 0.371 0.297 
 (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.052)*** 
Firm age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Innovative 0.217 0.217 0.215 0.216 0.215 0.093 
 (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.055)* 
Inverse Mills’ ratio      -0.319 
      (0.084)*** 
Number of observations 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,945 







Panel B. Branch-weighted regulation and supervision data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulatory stringency -0.171    -0.178 -0.243 
 (0.097)*    (0.104)* (0.116)** 
Prudential supervision  0.041   0.106 0.038 
  (0.142)   (0.161) (0.162) 
Restrictions on bank    0.038  0.014 0.001 
activities   (0.039)  (0.046) (0.046) 
Capital stringency    0.052 0.094 0.100 
    (0.078) (0.093) (0.094) 
Small firm 0.501 0.505 0.504 0.503 0.501 0.402 
 (0.070)*** (0.070)*** (0.070)*** (0.070)*** (0.070)*** (0.075)*** 
Big firm -0.079 -0.085 -0.083 -0.085 -0.083 -0.039 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.153) 
Public company 0.184 0.171 0.173 0.170 0.186 0.136 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) 
Sole proprietorship 0.134 0.124 0.127 0.126 0.128 0.215 
 (0.054)** (0.054)** (0.054)** (0.054)** (0.055)** (0.063)*** 
Privatized -0.103 -0.102 -0.102 -0.102 -0.108 -0.023 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) 
Non-exporter 0.246 0.246 0.246 0.245 0.246 0.142 
 (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.060)** 
Opaque 0.379 0.377 0.376 0.377 0.380 0.325 
 (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.054)*** 
Firm age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Innovative 0.195 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.196 0.102 
 (0.047)*** (0.047)*** (0.047)*** (0.047)*** (0.047)*** (0.057)* 
Inverse Mills’ ratio      -0.318 
      (0.094)*** 
Number of observations 3,736 3,736 3,736 3,736 3,736 3,736 
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s credit application has been rejected. 
‘Regulatory stringency’ is an index of regulatory restrictions. ‘Prudential supervision’ is an index of the scope 
and efficiency of home-country supervision. ‘Restrictions on bank activities’ is an index of regulatory 
restrictions on the activities of banks. ‘Capital stringency’ is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. 
The three variables are locality-specific and are constructed by weighting equally (Panel A) or by the number of 
branches (Panel B) the respective variable for each parent bank which has at least one branch or subsidiary in 
that locality. ‘Small firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 employees. ‘Big firm’ is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm has more than 250 employees. ‘Public company’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a 
shareholder company, or its shares traded in the stock market. ‘Sole proprietorship’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
firms is a sole proprietorship. ‘Privatized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. 
‘Non-exporter’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm does not export to foreign markets. ‘Opaque’ is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm does not employ external auditing services. ‘Firm age’ is the firm’s age in years. 
‘Innovative’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has introduced a new product line in the past 3 years. ‘Inverse 
Mills’ ratio’ is the inverse of Mills’ ratio from the probit model in Table 4 for each respective financial variable. 
Omitted category in firm size is ‘Medium firm’. Omitted category in firm ownership is ‘Private company’. 
Omitted categories from the probit equation in Table 5 are ‘Competition’ and ‘Subsidized’. Only localities 
where branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks account for more than 50% of the local market are included. 
All regressions include country and industry fixed effects. White (1980) robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. See 
Appendix 1 for exact definitions and data sources. 
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Table 6. 
Home country bank regulation and supervision, and host-country loan rejection rates: Interaction with firm risk 
 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regulatory stringency   Risk 0.241 0.212 0.099 0.134 0.198 0.194 0.186 0.195 
 (0.124)* (0.088)** (0.091) (0.075)* (0.113)* (0.083)** (0.087)** (0.080)** 
Prudential supervision   Risk 0.002 -0.142 -0.131 0.181 0.074 -0.207 -0.286 0.135 
 (0.234) (0.192) (0.199) (0.189) (0.209) (0.169) (0.166)* (0.167) 
Restrictions on bank activities   Risk 0.031 0.059 0.044 -0.025 -0.031 -0.084 0.045 -0.008 
 (0.074) (0.061) (0.065) (0.057) (0.050) (0.041)** (0.042) (0.039) 
Capital stringency   Risk -0.080 0.081 0.112 -0.243 -0.110 0.022 0.087 -0.180 
 (0.090) (0.071) (0.074) (0.072)*** (0.079) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061)*** 
Regulatory stringency -0.450 -0.327 -0.218 -0.486 -0.415 -0.341 -0.197 -0.578 
 (0.172)*** (0.140)** (0.136) (0.198)** (0.155)*** (0.126)*** (0.118)* (0.179)*** 
Prudential supervision 0.174 0.254 0.225 -0.198 -0.045 0.115 0.121 -0.252 
 (0.263) (0.205) (0.186) (0.341) (0.240) (0.185) (0.172) (0.307) 
Restrictions on bank activities -0.107 -0.105 -0.098 -0.068 0.020 0.045 -0.017 -0.010 
 (0.085) (0.068) (0.059)* (0.104) (0.063) (0.051) (0.048) (0.076) 
Capital stringency 0.104 -0.009 0.003 0.407 0.189 0.071 0.076 0.375 
 (0.139) (0.124) (0.119) (0.159)** (0.115) (0.099) (0.096) (0.134)*** 
Small firm 0.177 0.379 0.354 0.347 0.641 0.425 0.400 0.398 
 (0.828) (0.074)*** (0.073)*** (0.073)*** (0.595) (0.076)*** (0.075)*** (0.075)*** 
Big firm -0.027 -0.024 -0.041 -0.026 -0.036 -0.021 -0.035 -0.020 
 (0.154) (0.153) (0.153) (0.152) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.152) 
Public company 0.216 0.216 0.221 0.213 0.121 0.120 0.142 0.121 
 (0.120)* (0.120)* (0.120)* (0.120)* (0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.127) 
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Sole proprietorship 0.205 0.212 0.208 0.214 0.217 0.221 0.216 0.225 
 (0.061)*** (0.061)*** (0.061)*** (0.061)*** (0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.063)*** 
Privatized -0.039 -0.043 -0.034 -0.029 -0.020 -0.029 -0.021 -0.017 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Non-exporter -0.125 -0.128 -0.442 -0.131 -0.142 -0.146 0.065 -0.143 
 (0.056)** (0.056)** (0.760) (0.056)** (0.060)** (0.060)** (0.515) (0.061)** 
Opaque 0.304 -0.299 0.300 0.295 0.329 1.167 0.327 0.32 
 (0.053)*** -0.735 (0.052)*** (0.052)*** (0.054)*** (0.512)** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** 
Firm age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Innovative 0.098 0.097 0.096 0.543 0.106 0.108 0.103 0.259 
 (0.055)* (0.056)* (0.055)* (0.708) (0.057)* (0.057)* (0.057)* (0.496) 
Inverse Mills’ ratio -0.312 -0.311 -0.321 -0.333 -0.251 -0.239 -0.254 -0.266 
 (0.083)*** (0.084)*** (0.083)*** (0.084)*** (0.084)*** (0.086)*** (0.085)*** (0.085)*** 
Observations 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,736 3,736 3,736 3,736 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s credit application has been rejected. ‘Regulatory stringency’ is an index of regulatory restrictions. 
‘Prudential supervision’ is an index of the scope and efficiency of home-country supervision. ‘Restrictions on bank activities’ is an index of regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks. ‘Capital stringency’ is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. The three variables are locality-specific and are constructed by weighting equally 
(Columns labelled “Equally-weighted”) or by the number of branches (Columns labelled “Branch-weighted”) the respective variable for each parent bank which has at least 
one branch or subsidiary in that locality. ‘Small firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has from 2 to 49 employees. ‘Big firm’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has more 
than 250 employees. ‘Public company’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a shareholder company, or its shares traded in the stock market. ‘Sole proprietorship’ is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firms is a sole proprietorship. ‘Privatized’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is a former state-owned company. ‘Non-exporter’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
firm does not export to foreign markets. ‘Opaque’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm does not employ external auditing services. ‘Firm age’ is the firm’s age in years. 
‘Innovative’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has introduced a new product line in the past 3 years. ‘Inverse Mills’ ratio’ is the inverse of Mills’ ratio from the probit model 
in Table 4 for each respective financial variable. Omitted category in firm size is ‘Medium firm’. Omitted category in firm ownership is ‘Private company’. Omitted 
categories from the probit equation in Table 5 are ‘Competition’ and ‘Subsidized’. Only localities where branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks account for more than 
50% of the local market are included. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects. White (1980) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *** 




Home country bank regulation and supervision, and host-country loan rejection rates: Interaction between regulation and supervision 
 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regulatory stringency    0.952 0.307 0.938 0.359 0.554 -0.130 0.540 0.137 
Prudential supervision   Risk (0.521)* (0.397) (0.400)** (0.390) (0.526) (0.387) (0.412) (0.393) 
Restrictions on bank activities    0.059 0.353 0.439 0.036 -0.023 0.051 0.132 -0.102 
Prudential supervision   Risk (0.257) (0.216)* (0.226)** (0.211) (0.228) (0.179) (0.189) (0.181) 
Capital stringency    -0.038 0.601 -0.174 0.047 -0.151 0.415 -0.027 -0.009 
Prudential supervision   Risk (0.334) (0.279)** (0.282) (0.268) (0.298) (0.222)* (0.233) (0.230) 
Number of observations 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,736 3,736 3,736 3,736 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s credit application has been rejected. ‘Regulatory stringency’ is an index of regulatory restrictions. 
‘Prudential supervision’ is an index of the scope and efficiency of home-country supervision. ‘Restrictions on bank activities’ is an index of regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks. ‘Capital stringency’ is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. The three variables are locality-specific and are constructed by weighting equally 
(Columns labelled “Equally-weighted”) or by the number of branches (Columns labelled “Branch-weighted”) the respective variable for each parent bank which has at least 
one branch or subsidiary in that locality. All other covariates from Table 6 are also included in the regressions, alongside all possible double interaction between the three 
regulatory variables, ‘Prudential supervision’, and the four measures of risk.  Only localities where branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks account for more than 50% of 
the local market are included. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects. White (1980) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *** 





Home country bank regulation and supervision, and host-country risk-taking: Accounting for balance sheet strength 
 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regulatory stringency   Risk 0.264 0.163 0.056 0.112 0.175 0.117 0.113 0.141 
 (0.126)** (0.090)* (0.094) (0.087) (0.104)* (0.089) (0.095) (0.078)* 
Prudential supervision   Risk 0.003 -0.207 -0.07 0.164 0.019 -0.333 -0.182 0.073 
 (0.235) (0.195) (0.202) (0.191) (0.217) (0.176)* (0.183) (0.173) 
Restrictions on bank activities   Risk 0.042 -0.044 0.143 -0.079 -0.061 -0.163 0.114 -0.058 
 (0.102) (0.074) (0.079)* (0.072) (0.069) (0.053)*** (0.054)** (0.053) 
Capital stringency   Risk -0.086 0.137 0.063 -0.211 -0.085 0.096 0.031 -0.134 
 (0.094) (0.076)* (0.078) (0.076)*** (0.089) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069)* 
Tier 1 capital   Risk -0.005 0.225 0.206 0.094 0.063 0.151 0.135 0.085 
 (0.115) (0.081)*** (0.091)** (0.081) (0.085) (0.062)** (0.067)** (0.062) 
Number of observations 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,945 3,736 3,736 3,736 3,736 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s credit application has been rejected. ‘Regulatory stringency’ is an index of regulatory restrictions. 
‘Prudential supervision’ is an index of the scope and efficiency of home-country supervision. ‘Restrictions on bank activities’ is an index of regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks. ‘Capital stringency’ is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. ‘Tier 1 capital’ is an index of bank capitalization weighted for risk. The four 
regulatory/supervisory variables and Tier 1 are locality-specific and are constructed by weighting equally (Columns labelled “Equally-weighted”) or by number of branches 
(Columns labelled “Branch-weighted”) the respective variable for each parent bank which has at least one branch or subsidiary in that locality. All other covariates from 
Table 6 are also included in the regressions. Only localities where branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks account for more than 50% of the local market are included. 
All regressions include country and industry fixed effects. White (1980) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, 
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. See Appendix 1 for exact definitions and data sources. 
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Appendix 1. Domestic and parent banks in the sample 
   
Country Bank Parent bank and country of incorporation 
Albania Alpha Bank Alpha Bank - Greece 
 Raiffeisen Raiffeisen - Austria 
 Banka Kombetare Trektare Domestic 
 Tirana Bank Pireus Bank - Greece 
 Intessa San Paolo Bank Albania Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
 National Bank of Greece National Bank of Greece 
 Emporiki Emporiki Bank - Greece 
 Banka Credins Domestic 
Bulgaria Alpha bank Alpha Bank - Greece 
 Unicredit Bulbank UniCredit Group - Italy 
 DSK OTP - Hungary 
 First Investment Bank Domestic 
 PostBank EFG Eurobank - Greece 
 Expressbank Societe Generale - France 
 United Bulgarian Bank National Bank of Greece 
 Raiffeisen Raiffeisen - Austria 
 Piraeus Piraeus Bank - Greece 
Croatia Zagrebaska Bank UniCredit Group - Italy 
 Privredna Bank Zagreb Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
 Erste & Steiermarkische Bank Erste Group - Austria 
 Raiffeisen Bank Raiffeisen - Austria 
 Societe Generale - Splitska Banka Societe Generale - France 
 Hypo Alde Adria Bank Hypo Group - Austria 
 OTP Banka Hrvatska OTP - Hungary 
 Slavonska Banka Domestic 
 Hrvatska Postanska Banka Domestic 
Czech Republic Ceska Sporitelna Erste Group - Austria 
 CSOB KBC - Belgium 
 Komercni Banka Societe Generale - France 
 UniCredit Bank CR UniCredit Group - Italy 
 Citibank Citibank - US 
 Ceskomoravska zarucni a rozvojova banka Domestic 
 GE Money Bank GE Money - US 
 Hypotecni Banka KBC - Belgium 
 Raiffeisenbank Raiffeisen - Austiia 
Estonia Swedbank Estonia Swedbank - Sweden 
 SEB Skandinavska Enskilda Banken - Sweden 
 Sampo Pank Danske Bank - Denmark 
 Nordea Nordea Bank - Finland 
Hungary OTP Bank Domestic 
 K&H Commercial and Credit Bank KBC – Belgium 
 MKB Bank Bayerische Landesbank - Germany 
 CIB Bank Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
 Raiffeisen Bank Raiffeisen – Austria 
 Erste Bank Hungary Erste Group - Austria 
 KDB Bank KDB Seoul – Korea 
 UniCredit Bank Hungary UniCredit Group - Italy 
Latvia Parex Domestic 
 Hansabank Swedbank – Sweden 
 Latvijas Krajbanka Snoras Bank - Lithuania 
 SMP Bank Domestic 
 Rietumu Banka Domestic 
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 Trasta Komercbanka Domestic 
Lithuania SEB Skandinavska Enskilda Banken - Sweden 
 Sampo Pank Danske Bank - Denmark 
 Nordea Nordea Bank - Finland 
 Snoras Bank Domestic 
 Ukio Bankas Domestic 
 Hansabankas Swedbank – Sweden 
 Parex Bankas Parex Group – Latvia 
Macedonia Alpha Bank Alpha Bank – Greece 
 Stopanska Banka National Bank of Greece 
 Komercijalna Banka Domestic 
 NLB Tutunska Banka NLB - Slovenia 
 Ohridska Banka Societe Generale - France 
 Pro Credit Bank Pro Credit Group 
Poland PKO Bank Domestic 
 Bank Pekao UniCredit Group - Italy 
 Bank BPH UniCredit Group - Italy 
 Bank Zachodni WBK AIB -– Ireland 
 ING Bank Slaski ING Bank - Netherlands 
 Bank Pocztowy Domestic 
 Kredyt Bank KBC - Belgium 
 mBank Commerzbank - Germany 
 Getin Bank Domestic 
Romania BCR Erste Group - Austria 
 BRD Group Societe General Societe Generale - France 
 Volksbank Romania Volksbank - Austria 
 Raiffeisen Bank Raiffeisen - Austria 
 Alpha Bank Romania Alpha Bank – Greece 
 UniCredit Tiriac Bank UniCredit Group - Italy 
 Banca Transilvania Domestic 
 Bancpost EFG Eurobank - Greece 
 CEC Bank Domestic 
Slovakia Vseobecna Uverova banka Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
 Slovenska Sporitelna Erste Group - Austria 
 Tatra Banka Raiffeisen – Austira 
 OTP Banka Slovensko OTP – Hungary 
 Dexia Banka Slovensko Dexia – Belgium 
 UniCredit Bank Slovakia UniCredit Group - Italy 
 Volksbank Slovensko Volksbank - Austria 
 CSOB Slovakia KBC – Belgium 
Slovenia Nova Ljubljanska Banka KBC – Belgium 
 Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor Domestic 
 Abanka Domestic 
 SKB Societe Generale - France 
 UniCredit UniCredit Group - Italy 
 Banka Koper Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
 Banka Celje Domestic 




Appendix 2. Bank data coverage 
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Appendix 3. Variables – definitions  and sources 
   
Variable Name Definition Source 
Firm characteristics 
Small firm Dummy=1 if firm has less than 99 employees. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Medium firm Dummy=1 if the firm has between 100 and 499 employees. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Big firm Dummy=1 if firm has more than 500 employees. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Public company Dummy=1 if firm is a shareholder company / shares traded in the stock market. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Private company Dummy=1 if firm is a shareholder company / shares traded privately if at all. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Sole proprietorship Dummy=1 if firm is a sole proprietorship. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Privatized Dummy=1 if the firm went from state to private ownership in the past. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Subsidized Dummy=1 if the firm has received state subsidized in the past year. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Non-exporter Dummy=1 if no part of the firm’s production is exported to foreign markets. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Competition Dummy=1 if pressure from competitors is “fairly” or “very” severe. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Opaque Dummy=1 if the firm does not subject its financial accounts to external audit. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Firm age The number of years since the firm was officially incoroprated. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Innovative Dummy=1 if the firm has introduced at least one new credit line in the past 3 years. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Credit demand and credit access 
Need loan Dummy=1 if the firm doesn’t need a loan because it has sufficient capital. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Constrained Dummy=1 if the firm’s application for a bank loan was rejected. BEEPS 2005 & 2008 
Bank-level variables 
Regulatory stringency Composite index of 6 types of regulatory restrictions: credit controls and ceilings, interest rate controls, 
entry barriers, privatization, restrictions on international capital flows, and security markets regulation. 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Prudential supervision Composite index of 4 types of government intervention in prudential supervision: Basle-type capital 
adequacy ratio, independence from the executive, on-site and off-site supervision, coverage of all 
institutions. 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
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Restrictions on bank activities Composite index of regulatory restrictions on security market activities, insurance activities, real estate 
activities, and nonfinancial firm owenrship by banks. 
Barth et al. (2008) 
Capital stringency Composite index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, including minimum capital requirement 
adjusted for risk, deduction of loan losses, securities losses, and foreign exchange losses not realized, 
fraction of revaluation gains allowed, verification of sources of funds to be used as capital, regulation of 
initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital. 
Barth et al. (2008) 
Tier 1 capital Ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets Bankscope 2005 & 2008 
 
 
